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Farmland Preservation and
Differential Taxation: Evaluating
Optimal Policy Under Conditions
of Uncertainty
Robert J. Johnston
Differential property tax policy for farmland is often set under conditions of uncertainty and limited
information regarding landowners’ objective functions. This study examines optimal differential tax
policy for a parcel of agricultural land facing uncertain development, identifying instances in which
common farmland taxation policies may be non-optimal. Optimal tax rates are characterized given
three possible causes of uncertain development: exogenous offers from developers, tax-related
reductions in landowner wealth, and a combination of these factors. Model results indicate that
underlying causes of uncertain development are critical when seeking to assess the optimality of
differential taxation policies, and the use of a single, time-invariant differential tax levy is rarely
optimal given uncertain development.
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Differential taxation is a common tool employed to
prevent conversion of farmland to higher-density
residential or commercial uses. Most theoretical
analyses of differential taxation and land conversion
are based on models of land development and
timing. These approaches model development from
the perspective of the landowner; decisions regard-
ing potential enrollment of land in differential tax
programs and conversions from agricultural to non-
agricultural use are based on a comparison of the
discounted value of land in various uses (Anderson,
1986, 1993; Bentick, 1979, 1997; Bentick and
Pogue, 1988; England and Mohr, 2003; Capozza
and Helsley, 1989; Hennessy, 1999; Rose, 1973;
Shoup, 1970; Skouras, 1978).
Where uncertainty or limited information is ad-
dressed by existing work, it is typically introduced
in terms of landowner uncertainty regarding income,
land rents, and other factors (e.g., Parks and Quimio,
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1996; Anderson, 1993). In contrast, local and state
officials often choose tax policies without detailed
knowledge of landowner objective functions, and
under conditions of considerable uncertainty associ-
ated with the timing and ultimate causes of farm-
land conversion. Findings of the empirical literature
do not allay this uncertainty. For example, while
many empirical studies demonstrate little or no
impact of differential taxation programs (Ferguson,
1988; Parks and Quimio, 1996; Wunderlich, 1997),
others suggest differential taxation may indeed in-
fluence the extent and rate of development (Lopez,
Shah, and Altobello, 1994).
Optimal farmland tax policy under conditions
of uncertainty will not in general coincide with
analogous policy in a deterministic context. More-
over, the potential causes of uncertain development
may influence optimal policy. This study models
optimal tax policy under three scenarios, each
characterizing a different cause of uncertain devel-
opment.
The first scenario assumes development is trig-
gered solely by an exogenous (i.e., not tax related)
event—in this case, an offer from developers that
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occurs at an uncertain future date. The second
scenario assumes development is triggered solely
by taxation which reduces the wealth of the land-
owner to some uncertain threshold. Under the third
scenario, it is assumed that development is triggered
by a combination of these uncertain factors. All
models address optimal tax policy from the limited
information perspective of community policy
makers, in which detailed knowledge of landowner
objective functions is unavailable.
To determine optimal tax policy, an optimal con-
trol model is developed for a parcel of agricultural
land subject to uncertain and irreversible devel-
opment. As noted above, development may be
triggered by an exogenous offer from developers at
an uncertain future date, by excessive taxation that
reduces the wealth of the landowner to some uncer-
tain threshold, or by a combination of these factors.
Optimal policy is compared for each case and
contrasted with the case in which the risk of devel-
opment is not present.
 The primary purpose of this presentation is to
offer new insights into how communities may
improve tax policies given that development is un-
certain. Although the model is purposefully stylized
and abstracts from many issues addressed elsewhere
in the literature, it offers a perspective largely
absent from existing work. In particular, the model
demonstrates that the cause of uncertain develop-
ment has significant implications for optimal
farmland taxation, and that use of a single, time-
invariant tax levy is rarely optimal given uncertain
development.
General Theoretical Framework
The literature provides numerous models addressing
resource allocation under uncertainty. These include,
among others, models of nonrenewable resource
depletion given uncertain technological change
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; and Dasgupta and
Stiglitz, 1981), an examination of optimal forest
rotation given uncertain risk of forest fire (Reed,
1984), analyses of consumption given the risk of
pollution-induced catastrophe (Cropper, 1976; and
Clarke and Reed, 1994), an analysis of fishery
harvest policy given uncertain stock collapse (Reed,
1988), and a model of fishery harvest policy given
uncertain biomass shift (Johnston and Sutinen,
1996). Although these models focus on consump-
tion and resource depletion choices, similar per-
spectives may be used to address the choice of tax
policy given uncertain land conversion.
We begin with a simple model in which develop-
ment of a particular agricultural parcel of interest is
independent of property tax policy, as suggested by
the empirical studies of Ferguson (1988), and Parks
and Quimio (1996). While optimal control models
of resource policy under uncertain conditions are
often rich in potential solutions and policy impli-
cations (Cropper, 1976), they generally maintain a
relatively high degree of abstraction to preserve
generality and simplify analysis. The following
model continues in this tradition; the basic model is
kept simple to maintain a focus on the fundamental
questions of interest.
The model addresses optimal taxation and assess-
ment choices pertaining to a single parcel of
agricultural land. Although communities may be
precluded from establishing tax rates for individual
parcels, differential assessment levels for individual
parcels may be set on a case-by-case basis, allow-
ing policy makers some flexibility regarding the
total property tax levied on individual parcels.
1
Even if constraints prevent community officials
from moving toward more optimal policies, it may
nonetheless be useful to characterize optimal policy
under various scenarios and to assess implications
of non-optimal paths.
Tax policy is assumed to be determined by a
central authority seeking to maximize net commun-
ity benefits resulting from the collection of property
taxes, q(t), from a parcel of interest, and from the
amenity benefits generated by the same agricultural
parcel. The central authority would most likely
influence q(t) through changes in the assessed value
of the parcel, assuming the land is subject to a fixed
community-wide tax rate per dollar of assessed
value. Regardless of the method used to control
property taxes, the ultimate annual tax paid by the
landowner is assumed constrained by total wealth
and income, such that
(1) 0 x ' h(x) & q(t),
where x > 0 represents the accumulated wealth or
capital stock of the landowner (not including the
market value of the agricultural land), h(x) repre-
sents the annual increment to landowner wealth
resulting from agricultural use of the parcel, and the
1  For example, Rhode Island provides only recommended differential
assessment levels for individual parcels enrolled in the Farm, Forest, and
Open Space Act [Rhode Island Department of Environmental Manage-
ment (RIDEM), 2002]. Individual community tax assessors are given
considerable flexibility in determining assessments on enrolled parcels,
although in practice relatively standardized assessments are most often
used.200   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
dot (·) represents a partial derivative with respect to
time.
We specify where h(x)'i(x, ¯ k, ¯ g)&e(i(@), x, ¯ p),
represents income from the agricultural i(x, ¯ k, ¯ g)
use of the parcel, represents characteristics of the ¯ k
land parcel influencing its productivity as farmland
(assumed fixed), and represents characteristics of ¯ g
the landowner (also assumed fixed). Landowner
consumption expenditures are denoted ) e(i(@), x, ¯ p
and are assumed to depend on income, accumulated
wealth, and a vector of fixed prices and (¯ p). As ¯ k, ¯ g,
p ¯ are assumed fixed, and i(·) is a function of x,, ¯ k
and we suppress and i(·), and denote the ¯ g, ¯ k, ¯ g, ¯ p,
growth function h(x) as given above. Although this
is a stylized specification, it allows a focus on the
more fundamental questions of interest (i.e., the
influence of uncertainty on optimal taxation).
Existing wealth at time t is assumed to have a
diminishing but always positive marginal impact
on the increment to wealth at t, i.e., hN(x) > 0 and
hO(x) < 0, where the prime (N) denotes a partial deriv-
ative. The rationale for hO(x) < 0 is assumed dimin-
ishing returns to fixed factors of farm production
such as land acreage. It is further assumed that the
entire agricultural parcel is either maintained in its
existing agricultural use or sold for development, and
land holdings remain constant until the land is sold.
Social benefits are derived from tax collections,
q(t), as taxes support community services. Because
the community is assumed to place value on the
welfare of farm owners, social benefits also depend
on aggregate landowner wealth (x). Hence, the first
element of the planner’s objective function is de-
noted U(q, x). In the range of tax levies imposed on
farmland, we assume the following:
MU(@)
Mq
' Uq >0 , MU(@)
Mx




' Uqq <0 , M2U(@)
Mx2
' Uxx <0 ,
M2U(@)
MqMx
' Uqx >0 .
That is, the marginal social benefits of taxes col-
lected on the parcel are positive, and the social
benefits of the tax levy increase with the stock of
landowner wealth. The community benefits of the
tax levy increase at a decreasing rate, as either the
levy or the stock of wealth increases. Finally, the
impact of an increased stock of wealth on the mar-
ginal benefits of additional taxes is positive.
In addition to benefits associated with taxation of
the parcel, social benefits are provided by amenity
benefits of the agricultural parcel, given by ), V(¯ k
where again denotes the fixed characteristics of ¯ k
the parcel. To minimize unnecessary notation and
complication, we abstract from other exogenous fac-
tors that might affect aggregate net social benefits.
Optimal Taxation Given Exogenous
Development Pressure
We first consider optimal taxation when there is a
risk of development due solely to exogenous devel-
oper behavior (i.e., an offer to purchase the land
parcel), independent of property tax levels. Assume
an offer sufficient to induce sale of the land occurs
at time T, and results in the conversion of the parcel
to residential or commercial use. At this point, the
parcel ceases to generate amenity benefits of farm-
land  ) and the benefits associated with taxation V(¯ k
U(q,x) of the farmland parcel, and instead generates
annual net benefits associated with developed land—
i.e., at conversion time T, U(q, x) ' V(¯ k) ' 0.
The net benefits (or costs) of the developed parcel,
realized subsequent to time T, are given by W(k
*),
where k
* represents the attributes of the developed
property, assumed exogenous and fixed. Specifically,
where describes the characteristics of the parcel ¯ k
as farmland, k
* represents its attributes as a devel-
oped property (e.g., the number of houses, size of
subdivided lots, extent of sewer and drainage infra-
structure, etc.).
Implicit in the assumption of a fixed optimal
W(k
*) is the assumption that once developed, the
property will retain a constant generation of tax
revenues (based on standard residential or commer-
cial tax rates) and community costs. This assumption
is made for simplification purposes only; relaxing
it does not change fundamental model results. It is
hypothesized that W(k
*) may be positive or negative,
depending on the relationship between the tax
revenues and community costs generated by the
developed parcel.
The function W(k
*) does not include the wealth
of the agricultural landowner as an argument, imply-
ing the individual’s wealth is of no concern to the
community once the land has been sold. Although
made for convenience, this assumption corresponds
to the notion that communities place particular value
on the welfare of active farmers. Thus, once the
landowner converts his or her property to nonfarm
use, the community ceases to consider the land-
owner’s wealth in its objective function.Johnston Farmland Preservation and Differential Taxation   201
To incorporate a random date of an offer sufficient
to induce land development, we follow Johnston
and Sutinen (1996) and assume T is a random num-
ber with a probability density function f(t), where




f(t) dt ' 1.
Given this specification, the probability that an offer
sufficient to cause development has not yet occurred







F(0) ' 1, F(4) ' 0, and
0 F '& f(t) ' MF(t)
Mt
<0 .
These expressions indicate the land has not yet
been developed at time zero, will definitely be
developed at some point in the future, and the prob-
ability that the land will continue in its undeveloped
state diminishes as one looks further into the future.
To allow for a steady-state result, we follow
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and assume a constant
hazard function, given by
∆ ' f(t)
F(t)
' & 0 F(t)
F(t)
>0 .
Here, the risk of development is assumed to be
independent of time, or the conditional probability
of development at t (given development has not yet
occurred) is assumed constant.
Assume the community government maximizes
expected social tax and amenity benefits generated
by the land parcel of interest. Following Dasgupta














e&r(t&T) W(k() dt dT.





e&rtF(t) U(q, x) % V(¯ k)
% e&rt 1 & F(t) W(k() dt.
The authority maximizes (3) subject to (1). The
Hamiltonian follows directly from (1) and (3).
Necessary conditions defining the optimal path
of property taxes and savings stock include:
(4) F(t)Uq ' λ
and
(5) 0 λ ' λ r & hN(x) & F(t)Ux,
where λ represents the present-value costate vari-
able.
The optimal steady-state tax rate (q*) and stock
of savings (x*) are found by solving (1), (4), and (5)
when This steady state is characterized by 0 h ' 0 λ ' 0.




where as before. ∆ '&0 F(t)/F(t)
In the absence of development risk, (6) is
replaced with hN(x) ' r !Ux/Uq. The addition of the
positive hazard rate, ∆, given the functional char-
acteristics of hN(x) and Ux/Uq, implies steady-state
wealth (x*) is lower than in the no-development
case, and hence will support a lower optimal steady-
state tax levy (q*).
Optimal tax and wealth trajectories leading to the
steady state may be assessed through the phase
diagram characterized by (1), (4), and (5). From (1),
the isocline is characterized by q(t)'h(x). 0 x ' 0
From (4) and (5), it may be shown that
(7) 0 q '
Uq r % ∆ & hN(x) & Ux
Uqq
,
whereby the isocline is characterized by Ux ' 0 q ' 0
Uq(r + ∆ ! hN(x)). Although ambiguities regarding
the relative magnitudes and functional forms of the
arguments in (1) and (7) prevent exact and un-
ambiguous specification of the iso- 0 x ' 0a n d0 q ' 0
clines, common properties of the phase diagram are
illustrated by figure 1.
2
Figure 1 shows the isocline, together with 0 x ' 0
the isoclines given both ∆>0 and ∆'0—i.e., 0 q ' 0
under both positive and zero exogenous develop-
ment risk, respectively. The corresponding steady
states are located at the intersections of the isoclines,
and are saddlepoints. Approach paths depicted by
the phase diagram show that for any initial level of
wealth x0 greater than both steady states, the opti-
mal tax levy q will begin higher and decline more
quickly when there is an exogenous risk of devel-
opment (∆>0, figure 1). As a result of higher taxes
2  The phase diagram in figure 1 is characterized based on the general
functional forms U(q, x) = Aq
αx
β (A >0 ;  0<α <1 ;  0<β<1 ;   α + β #1) and
h(x) = M !Ne
!γx (M, N >0 ;  0<γ <1), where e is the exponential operator.
Similar phase diagrams result from other common functional forms.202   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
in early periods, wealth declines more rapidly in the
∆>0 case compared to the ∆'0 case, leading to
lower steady-state wealth. This is illustrated by the
two dashed approach trajectories to the steady states
from initial landowner wealth x0.
Analogous patterns apply for an initial stock
less than the steady states; initial tax levies are x0 N
higher when the risk of development is positive,
leading to lower steady-state wealth. For initial
wealth between the two steady states, the optimal
approach path for ∆'0 (no risk of development)
involves lower initial taxes such that wealth in-
creases to a higher steady state. For ∆>0 (positive
risk of development), the optimal path involves
higher initial tax levies whereby wealth decreases
to its lower steady state.
In all cases, once the steady state is reached,
steady-state taxes are lower in the ∆>0 case,
corresponding to the lower optimal steady-state
wealth. However, these lower steady-state taxes are
only optimal once landowner wealth has been
diminished through the higher initial taxation that
is optimal given an exogenous risk of development.
The rationale behind such patterns is intuitive. If
a community knows that a farmer will sell land to
a developer at some point in the future, and that
development is caused entirely by exogenous
factors (i.e., is unrelated to tax policy), then optimal
policy will extract greater tax revenues from the
parcel while it remains in agricultural use. From a
neoclassical perspective, the risk of development
reduces the expected future value to society of an
additional dollar of landowner wealth. Once the
land is developed, the stock of landowner wealth
generates no additional benefits for the community,
as the original landowner no longer owns the parcel
and no longer pays property taxes. Accordingly,
optimal taxation is characterized by increased tax
levies in early periods, leading to reduced land-
owner wealth in the steady state.
An additional feature of model results here is
that neither the value of developed land nor the
amenity benefits of farmland has any effect on
optimal pre-development tax policy. That is, neither
the annual post-development flow of benefits,
W(k
*), nor the external amenity benefits of farm-
land, appear in the equations specifying the V(¯ k),
steady state. This result applies because tax policy
in this case has no effect on the date of develop-
ment. Accordingly, the best the tax authority can do
is to maximize expected tax benefits prior to the
uncertain development date, and then follow the
new optimal tax policy on the property once
developed.
The above model applies to cases such as those
discussed by Parks and Quimio (1996), Ferguson
(1988), and Wunderlich (1997), in which differen-
tial taxation has no discernable impact on develop-
ment decisions. In such cases, the results here
suggest common tax policies may be non-optimal.
For example, communities may react to increased
likelihood of farmland conversion by reducing taxes
on farmland at risk of development. However, in the
case where the risk of development is exogenous,
Figure 1. Phase plane analysis and comparative dynamics of the exogenous
development caseJohnston Farmland Preservation and Differential Taxation   203
the optimal response to an increase in exogenous
development pressure is an increase in short-term
tax levies, leading to lower landowner wealth than
would be optimal in the no-development case. This
finding illustrates the potentially counter-intuitive
result that increased development risk can increase
short-run optimal tax levies on farmland.
Optimal Taxation Given Uncertain Wealth-
Related Development
We now turn to the case in which the uncertain date
of development is related solely to the accumulated
wealth of the landowner. This scenario reflects the
“farmland as retirement policy” case, in which the
farmer will sell his/her land to finance retirement
unless sufficient wealth is available.
Assume there is a standing offer from developers
to purchase the property, and the landowner would
prefer to maintain the land in agricultural use.
However, if property taxes drive wealth down to a
critical threshold, S, then the landowner will sell the
land. S is assumed to be known to the landowner
but unknown to the central authority. It is further
assumed that wealth at time zero (x0) is greater
than S, and x0 is of sufficient size to prevent the
“extinction” strategy associated with sub-marginal
resources (Clark, 1971).
Under this scenario, community officials do not
know with certainty the critical wealth threshold
below which the landowner will sell the parcel. To
model the uncertain wealth stock at which conver-
sion will occur, we apply a probability specification
similar to that used to model uncertain pollution
catastrophe (e.g., Cropper, 1976; Clarke and Reed,
1994) and uncertain biomass shift (Johnston and
Sutinen, 1996).
From the perspective of the central authority, S
is a random variable, distributed over the interval
[0, x0], with a probability density function f(S). The
likelihood that sale of the property will not occur














' 0, œ x $ x0.
Other aspects of the model remain as specified
above. Accordingly, the central authority maximizes





e&rt F(x) U(q, x) % V(¯ k)
% e&rt 1 & F(x) W(k() dt,
subject to (1) as before. The necessary conditions
for a maximum include (1) and
(10) F(x)Uq ' ω,
(11) 0 ω ' ω r & hN(x) & Fx U(q, x) % V(¯ k)
% FxW(k() & F(x)Ux,
where ω is the current-value costate variable. Equa-
tions (10) and (11) provide necessary but not suffi-
cient conditions. Given the characteristics of the
expected benefit function (9), joint concavity may
not be an appropriate general assumption (Cropper,
1976). Without this assumption, one cannot guaran-
tee the usual sufficiency conditions.
However, assuming a steady state exists, and
assuming (10) and (11) identify a global maximum,
the steady state is characterized by





(13) θ(q, x, ¯ k) '








where ψ(q, x, k
*) may be greater, less than, or equal
to zero.
The mathematics of the phase diagram are more
complex than those in the exogenous development
case. The isocline is characterized by the equa- 0 x'0
tion q(t)'h(x). From (10) and (11), it may be shown
that













While the phase diagram is rich in potential
solutions, a characteristic pattern is illustrated by204   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
figure 2.
3 This pattern presumes the net value to the
community of the undeveloped parcel exceeds the
net value of the developed parcel, or ) > U(@) % V(¯ k
W(k
*). This assumption appears reasonable in the
current policy context, given that a rational com-
munity would only apply differential taxation in
cases where preservation of farmland is beneficial
[i.e., Hence, the discussion U(@) % V(¯ k)>W(k()].
emphasizes this case.
If then optimal tax levies in U(@)%V(¯ k)>W(k(),
this case are lower in early periods leading to
greater steady-state landowner wealth, compared to
the case in which there is no wealth-related risk of
development. Approach paths to the steady state are
illustrated by the dashed lines in figure 2. For any
initial x0 greater than the two steady states, the pres-
ence of wealth-related development risk (Fx/F(x)> 0,
figure 2) leads to a decrease in initial tax levies,
leading ultimately to higher steady-state wealth. In
the absence of development risk (Fx/F(x)'0, figure
2), higher initial tax levies lead to lower steady-
state wealth. Simply put, in the case where reduced
landowner wealth leads to an increased probability
of development, optimal policy maintains higher
wealth to discourage land conversion.
These conclusions may be verified through
analysis of the different terms in (12). The term
θ reflects the prospect of inducing develop- (q, x, ¯ k)
ment with higher taxes and associated wealth reduc-
tions. Where >0, the inclusion of this term θ(q,x,¯ k)
in (12) leads to higher steady-state wealth com-
pared to the no-development case.
4
The term ψ(q, x, k
*) reflects the net value of the
developed property to the existing community. If
the annual net benefits of the developed parcel,
W(k
*), are positive, then ψ(q, x, k
*) will be greater
than zero, and its presence in (12) tends to offset
that of reducing the optimal steady-state θ(q,x,¯ k),
stock of savings.
5 If ψ(q, x, k
*) is negative, then its
inclusion augments the effect of leading θ(q,x,¯ k),
to higher steady-state savings. These results are
intuitive—if development is dependent on tax
policy, then anticipated positive net benefits from
the developed parcel make preservation of the
agricultural land (and hence landowner wealth) less
crucial, and vice versa.
3  The phase diagram for figure 2 is characterized based on functional
forms analogous to those in figure 1. The probability that development
will not occur at a given stock is specified using the general functional
form F(x) = (e
ηx !1)/(e
ηx +1), (0 < η <1).
4  The only exception to this general case holds when  = ψ(q, θ(q,x,¯ k)
x, k
*) = 0, which occurs if Fx /F(x) = 0 (where the marginal effect of stock
changes on the risk of development are zero). Given our definitions of Fx
and F(x), this can only occur for x > x0, or in cases where the optimal
stock of landowner savings in the no-development case is greater than the
initial stock x0. Specifically, since the critical threshold S < x0, the risk of
development drops to zero for all x > x0 (if S > x0, development would
have already occurred at time zero). Accordingly, if the optimal path in
the no-development case leads to a steady-state x > x0, then the risk of
development can have no additional impact on the steady state. This
result also implies that θ(q, x, )—despite its (generally) positive impact ¯ k
on the optimal stock of steady-state landowner savings—cannot by itself
lead to optimal steady-state landowner savings greater than the initial
level x0.
5  The discussion of this term assumes that Fx /F(x) > 0. If this condition
does not hold, then θ(q, x,)  =  ψ(q, x, k
*) = 0, as discussed in footnote 3. ¯ k
Figure 2. Phase plane analysis and comparative dynamics of the wealth-
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The contrast between optimal policy in this case
(wealth-related development risk) and that found in
the prior model (exogenous development risk) is
one of the fundamental results of the analysis. If the
probability of development is independent of tax
levels, then the optimal approach path unambigu-
ously leads to lower steady-state landowner wealth.
If, in contrast, the community can influence the
probability of development through tax policy, then
the optimal approach path leads to higher steady-
state landowner wealth as long as preservation of
farmland is beneficial to the community [i.e., U(·)
+ Optimal policy under exogenous V(¯ k)>W(k()].
development risk (i.e., higher initial tax levies
leading to lower wealth) is the opposite of optimal
policy under wealth-related development risk (i.e.,
lower initial tax levies leading to higher wealth).
Optimal Policy in the General Case
We now consider the general and more complex
case, in which development is influenced both by
uncertain developer offers and community tax rates.
To model this case, it is assumed that a developer
offer of a specific size may cause the landowner to
sell (develop) the agricultural property if the land-
owner’s existing stock of wealth is small, but will
be rejected if the landowner’s wealth is large. We
define f(t, x(t)) as the joint probability density func-
tion of T, where T is the uncertain date of develop-
ment given a specific savings level x.
Following the development of the previous
models, define




f τ, x(τ) dτ
as the probability that development has not yet
occurred at time t. Further, assume
Ft ' MF
Mt
<0 a n d Fx ' MF
Mx
>0 ,
œ x < x0,
indicating that a greater stock of wealth diminishes
the probability of development due to uncertain
developer purchase offers. All other features of the
model remain as specified above.






e&rt F(t, x)[U(q, x) % V(¯ k)]
% e&rt[1& F(t, x)]W(k() dt,
subject to (1) as before.
As noted in the prior model, the dynamics of the
optimal harvest path and approach to the steady
state are complex; a steady-state optimum is not
ensured. If an optimal steady-state tax policy does
exist, it is characterized by








, ˆ θ(@) '
Fx[U(@) % V(¯ k)]
F(t, x)Uq
,








' 0, Mˆ θ(@)
Mt
' 0, and Mˆ ψ(@)
Mt
' 0;
i.e., an autonomous solution is assumed.
Despite the complexity of the equations speci-
fying the approach path and steady state, some
general policy conclusions may be drawn. Since
then the optimal steady-state ˆ ∆(@)>0a n dˆ θ(@)>0 ,
wealth accumulation will be greater than that in (ˆ x)
the case where the probability of development was
exogenous (x*), or independent of differential tax
rates. In other words, initial tax collections are lower,
such that steady-state wealth accumulates to a higher
level. This higher steady-state wealth ultimately sup-
ports higher steady-state tax levies, but only after
lower tax collections in early periods allow wealth
to grow to the higher steady-state level.
Compared to the case in which the probability of
development is due solely to tax policy, steady-state
savings are lower and steady-state taxes are (ˆ x <˜ x),
lower, representing more aggressive taxation ap-
proaching the steady state. Whether the steady state
will more closely approximate the exogenous devel-
opment case or the tax-related development case
depends on the relative magnitudes of (repre- ˆ ∆(@)
senting the impact of exogenous development risk)
and (representing the impact of wealth ˆ θ(@) % ˆ ψ(@)
related development risk).
Comparison to the no-development case is simpli-
fied by manipulating (17) to yield
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The term !Ft/F(t, x) represents the impact of the
exogenous portion of the development probability,
or the conditional probability of development at t in
the absence of any changes in x. As before, this
term leads one to maintain lower steady-state land-
owner savings, based on more aggressive optimal
taxation as one approaches the steady state.
The next term,
   &
Fx
F(t, x)
[U(q, x) % V(¯ k) & W(k()]
Uq
,
represents the impact of development probability
associated with tax-related changes in the stock of
landowner savings. Note that the relative impact of
this term not only depends on the underlying prob-
ability density functions, but also on the social ben-
efits received from taxation (U(q, x)), the amenity
benefits of farmland (V( )), and the net benefits of ¯ k
the land once developed (W(k
*)). As long as the
term in brackets [U(q, x) + V()   !W(k
*)] is greater ¯ k
than zero (and assuming Fx/F(t, x)>0, as discussed
above), the entire term will tend to offset the impact
of !Ft/F(t, x). That is, it will lead to a higher opti-
mal stock of steady-state savings.
The impact of W(k
*) depends on its sign. If the
net benefits of the developed property are positive,
then larger values for this term will lead to more
aggressive taxation approaching the steady state,
leading to lower steady-state taxes and wealth. If
net benefits of the developed property are negative,
then larger (more negative) magnitudes of W(k
*)
will augment the impact of lead- U(q, x)a n dV(¯ k),
ing to higher optimal steady-state savings.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study characterizes optimal differential tax
policy from the limited knowledge perspective
of community tax authorities, in cases where
landowner objective functions are unknown and
development prospects are uncertain. The model
illustrates that in such cases, theoretical approaches
similar to those used to assess optimal natural
resource use under uncertainty may be applied to
tax policy.
Although the model is purposefully kept simple,
it yields findings not evident in the existing liter-
ature. Of particular relevance are the conclusions
that the underlying causes of uncertain development
are critical when seeking to assess the optimality of
differential taxation policies, and that the use of a
single, fixed differential tax levy is rarely optimal
given uncertain development. Model results are
summarized by table 1.
For states in which differential taxation of farm-
land is based on current use value assessment, state-
wide regulations and guidelines typically determine
assessment policy. Yet, states such as Rhode Island
provide only nonbinding assessment recommen-
dations, leaving local communities considerable
flexibility in determining differential assessments
for particular parcels or types of farmland (RIDEM,
2002). While this flexibility may not allow annual
changes in tax levies necessary to achieve optimal
policies of the type identified here, it nevertheless
allows communities some ability to tailor differen-
tial taxation to increase net benefits. However, the
existing literature provides little guidance—either
empirical or theoretical—to assist communities in
assessing the optimality of existing tax policies
when development is uncertain.
Results here may assist communities in deter-
mining whether changes to farmland tax policies
would increase net community benefits related to
taxation and farmland conservation. Although
theoretical results alone fall short of providing a
simple quantitative formula that communities might
use to determine specific tax levels for farmland
parcels, they nonetheless provide insight into opti-
mal tax policies—policies which may in some cases
run contrary to common wisdom.
For example, while common wisdom might
dictate reducing initial tax levies (to increase farm
profits) in response to increased development risk,
model results indicate such actions are only optimal
if the probability of development is correlated with
landowner wealth and the net community benefits
of farmland exceed those of developed land
(table 1, case IIa). More specifically, in cases where
development is influenced solely by tax policy,
optimal differential tax rates depend on a comparison
of net pre-development social value of farmland
and net post-development value. If community ben-
efits of farmland exceed those of developed land,
then optimal tax levies will be lower in early
periods, leading to greater steady-state landowner
wealth.
In contrast, if development is driven solely by
exogenous developer behavior (table 1, case I),
optimal differential tax levies are higher in early
periods, leading to lower landowner wealth in the
steady state. In such cases, communities might
consider increasing taxes on farmland in the near
term, with resulting revenues used to fund alter-
native conservation policies. Comparison to theJohnston Farmland Preservation and Differential Taxation   207
Table 1. Summary of Model Results: Optimal Tax Policy Given Uncertain Development
Case Cause of Uncertain Development
Initial Taxation
(Property Taxes Prior





 I Development caused solely by exogenous
developer offer, ∆ >0
Higher Lower/Lower
 IIa Development caused by reduction of 
landowner wealth to critical threshold,
U(@) % V(¯ k)>W(k()b
Lower Higher/Higher
 IIb Development caused by reduction of 
landowner wealth to critical threshold,
U(@) % V(¯ k)<W(k()c
Higher Lower/Lower
 III Development caused by combination of






a Compared to the case in which there is no risk of development.
b Represents the case emphasized in the text, in which the value to the community of the undeveloped parcel exceeds that of the developed
parcel, justifying differential taxation policy.
c Represents a case deemphasized in the text, in which the value to the community of the developed parcel exceeds that of the undeveloped
parcel. Conservation activity and standard differential taxation is unjustified in this case; hence it represents a less relevant scenario in the
current discussion.
wealth-related development case shows that a simple
shift in the cause of uncertain development (exogen-
ous versus wealth-related) can generate diametrically
opposing policy prescriptions (table 1).
In the general case where development may be
related to both exogenous and endogenous factors,
optimal policy depends on the balance between un-
certain elements underlying development probability.
Unlike the prior cases, this more complex model
does not generate unambiguous guidance regarding
increases or decreases in initial tax levies (table 1).
However, even the more complex general case
illustrates the type of insights that may be gained
though models addressing optimal policy under
conditions which more closely simulate situations
facing community policy makers. In the case of
differential taxation and farmland conservation, this
situation includes a lack of access to landowner
objective functions and corresponding uncertainty
regarding the time at which development may occur.
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